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vABSTRACT 
The importance of Information Assurance (IA) in military operations cannot be 
overstated. It is a sine qua non that achieving IA requires the effort of all personnel in the 
organization; just a single untrained end-user is needed to defeat many well thought-out 
and well-executed security strategies This thesis demonstrated that CyberCIEGE, with its 
rich elements and tools, can be used to create game scenarios, mimicking real life IA 
issues, for conveying security lessons to a wide audience of trainees. It provides an 
excellent alternative to the traditional methods of security education which so often fail in 
driving home the intended lessons. 
A military-based CyberCIEGE scenario definition file (SDF) was developed to 
illustrate and train players on the importance of ensuring hardware and software integrity 
in operational-critical systems. The focus of the research was on the protection of 
sensitive information systems through the maintenance of their software integrity and the 
application of an air-gapped network architecture. The test cases developed in this thesis 
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1I. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter introduces the topic of this research and introduces the scope and 
outline of the remainder of the document. 
 
A.  THESIS STATEMENT 
The purpose of this thesis was to investigate how CyberCIEGE can be used as a 
tool for security educational where the objective is to improve the security awareness 
level of personnel in an organization that has demanding needs for integrity of critical 
operational networks. CyberCIEGE is “a high-end, commercial-quality video game 
developed jointly by Rivermind and the Naval Postgraduate School’s Center for 
Information Systems Security Studies and Research” (Irvine 2005, 2). 
The research focused on the development of a CyberCIEGE Scenario Definition 
File (SDF) that is intended to mimic real life Information Assurance (IA) issues and 
educate the players on integrity issues found in a military environment.  
This research aimed to answer the following three questions: 
1. First Question 
Can a scenario be developed such that it is both playable and educational while 
illustrating the need for security and protection of mission critical data in a networked 
military environment? 
2. Second Question 
Can a scenario illustrate the tensions, trade-offs and decisions a network manager 
has to make when deciding between the use of an air-gapped network that is separated 
from the Internet and the need for web connectivity? 
3. Third Question 
From the perspective of information assurance, to what extent is the use of 
commercial software on an air-gapped network comparable to connecting the network to 
the Internet, in terms of subjecting the network to possible malicious acts by adversaries? 
 
2This thesis contributes to the ongoing research and development of the 
CyberCIEGE project at the Naval Postgraduate School. 
 
B.  THESIS SCOPE AND LAYOUT 
The scope of the thesis is to create a CyberCIEGE SDF that can be used to 
educate DoD personnel and intermediate level computer science students on security 
topics such as the importance of maintaining physical network isolation of critical 
backbone networks; the integrity of commercial software; and the controlled movement 
of information from a low integrity network to a high integrity network. 
This thesis comprises the following chapters: 
1.  Chapter I - Introduction 
This introductory chapter provides the thesis statements and describes the scope 
and layout of the thesis. 
2.  Chapter II - Background 
This chapter covers the background information that establishes a framework for 
scenario development and provides readers with an overview of computer security and 
the current information security training situation. It also describes how CyberCIEGE can 
be used as an effective security training tool and highlights the importance of integrity in 
military systems.  
3.  Chapter III – Scenario Strategy 
This chapter discusses how CyberCIEGE can be used as a security educational 
tool to improve the security awareness level of personnel in an organization that has 
demanding needs for integrity of mission-critical networks. 
4.  Chapter IV - Scenario Description 
This chapter describes in detail the implementation of the scenario strategies to 
create a SDF that can be used to convey security lessons about the need for software 
integrity and an air-gapped network architecture in a sensitive military environment. 
5.  Chapter V – Scenario Testing 
This chapter discusses the test objectives and methodologies applied to verify the 
correctness of the Operation Artemis scenario. It also covers the informal testing 
3conducted during the scenario development process,which contributed to the 
improvement of the SDT and the CyberCIEGE game engine. 
6.  Chapter VI – Conclusion and Recommendations 
This is the final chapter of the thesis. It provides recommendations, suggests 
future work for the CyberCIEGE project and concludes the thesis.  
 
C. SUMMARY 
In this chapter the thesis statement and the scope of the thesis are defined. 
Readers are also provided with an outline of the thesis and a brief description of the 
contents of each chapter in the thesis. Subsequent chapters will further develop the topics 
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5II. BACKGROUND 
This chapter covers the background information that establishes a framework for 
scenario development. It is intended to provide the readers an overview of computer 
security and an overview of the current information security training situation. It 
describes how CyberCIEGE can be used as an effective security training tool, and 
highlights the importance of integrity in military systems. The chapter also depicts the 
contribution of the thesis to the overall goal of the CyberCIEGE project and elaborates on 
computer security issues - such as the use of commercial software in mission critical 
systems and the application of air-gapped networks to reduce the risk of outsider attacks. 
 
A. THE PAST, THE PRESENT, AND THE FUTURE OF CYBER SECURITY 
The Internet emerged from a research program initiated by the United States 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) in 1973 for the development of 
communication protocols to enable interaction between networked computers (Cerf 
2004). This research program was known as the Internetting project, and the resulting 
systems of networks were called ARPAnet, which eventually grew into today’s Internet 
(Leiner 2003). During its infancy in the early 70s, computing power and knowledge were 
still limited to a privileged and trusted few, and computer security was not yet a pressing 
and popular concern. This was to change with the vast proliferation of microcomputers. 
The introduction of personal computers by Apple and IBM coupled with the introduction 
of global Internet in the late 70s and early 80s provided computing resources to the 
masses. These, however, also gave rise to a heightened awareness of computer security 
and information assurance issues, as they provided malicious users a springboard to learn 
and execute their crafts of cracking systems.  
Cyber security is a concern in today’s wired world. Kessler (1997) states: 
In an ideal world, there would be no need for network or computer 
security. There would be no threats to your information. No one would be 
trying to break into any of your systems. There would be no disgruntled 
employees, competitors would not be trying to steal your secrets, and 
people with the smarts necessary to break into computer systems and 
create viruses would be working on more constructive endeavors. 
Unfortunately, we do not live in an ideal world and, therefore, we do have 
6to be concerned with security, possible break-ins, viruses, attacks from the 
Internet, and even security breaches from inside our own network. 
(Kessler 1997) 
The modern world greatly depends on the use of computers and computer 
networks. They are instrumental to the daily operations of companies, organizations, and 
government. The management and operation of a nation’s critical systems and 
infrastructures - such as nuclear power plants, dams, air traffic control systems, and the 
financial and economic infrastructures are hugely dependent on the correct functioning of 
its computers and computer networks. Life today depends on information. While this has 
been true for centuries, it has never been as true since the invention of the modern digital 
computer and the birth of the Internet. In today’s world, up-to-date and “correct 
information is the key to any successful endeavor.” (Kessler 1997) 
Information security and military operations are intertwined. The importance of 
information security to military operations cannot be overstated (Ryan 1997). History has 
shown that information is critical to the success or failure of battles, campaigns, and 
wars. Some of the tried and proven methods by military commanders and theoreticians in 
gaining ascendancy in battles and obtaining knowledge of an opponent's intentions 
include the capturing of the opponent’s messengers and the interception of written war 
plans or messages from the opponent’s signaling devices. 
In the First World War, the Germans were able to obtain the Russian’s operation 
plans and tactical orders when they exploited the Russian’s battlefield communications. 
This gave the German army unparallel advantages over their opponents and as a result, 
the decisive victory by the German army over a Russian army that was twice its size at 
Tannenberg in August of 1914. The lesson from the Tannenberg battle to military 
commanders regarding the importance of information security was clear. When 
battlefield communication and information system security fails, the battle may be lost. 
The following extracts from Jackson (2002) provided a brief description of the battlefield 
situations at Tannenberg: 
The majority of the men did not know how to use the devices or 
understand how the substitution ciphers were used to code messages. 
Additionally, complete codes were not distributed to all the corps for fear 
of them being lost and/or captured by the Germans. Also, it took time to 
7print and distribute codebooks, and given the fact that there was a large 
degree of illiteracy among the enlisted men that made the codebooks 
virtually useless, there was little impetus to expend energy on producing 
them. As a result, all communications (telephone, telegraph, wireless, and 
messenger) would be transmitted in the clear. (Jackson 2002) 
In the Second World War, information security failures on the part of the Axis 
powers provided the Allies an overwhelming advantage and contributed significantly to 
the outcome of the war. The following quotation from FCW2 (2005) depicts how the 
tides of the war changed when the secrecy of the Japanese communication was 
compromised: 
The Battle of Midway in June, 1942 was arguably the turning point of 
World War II in the Pacific rim. The victory hinged partly on U.S. code 
crackers' breaking JN25 naval cipher to learn that the Japanese planned to 
attack Midway. Adm. Chester Nimitz, commander of the U.S. Pacific 
fleet, sent two carrier task forces to Midway to ambush the Japanese Navy. 
(FCW2 2005) 
State sponsored attacks are also not uncommon. “Governments have been known 
to clandestinely insert vulnerabilities into the software embedded in outsourced products 
for their adversaries” (IT Pro 2005). One classical example is the “Farewell Dossier” 
campaign which was coordinated by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the 
early 1980s. The following paragraph summarizes the incident as described in IT Pro.  
The “Farewell Dossier” campaign orchestrated by the CIA had the Russian spies 
deceived into stealing computer chips embedded with a software Trojan horse by the US. 
The Soviets had intended to use the stolen software to control the electromechanical 
devices that would regulate the flow of natural gas through the Trans-Siberian pipeline. 
The Soviets proceeded to use the chips without detecting the Trojan horse, and the 
malicious software adjusted the output control signals to the electromechanical devices to 
increase pressure in the pipeline, resulting in the equivalent of a 3-kiloton explosion. This 
disaster made it financially difficult for the Soviets to pursue their defense research that 
they had planned to fund with natural gas revenues, and subsequently led to the ending of 
the cold war era (IT Pro 2005). The following extracts from Safire (2004) also described 
the “Farewell Dossier” campaign: 
8The technology topping the Soviets' wish list was for computer control 
systems to automate the operation of the new, trans-Siberian gas pipeline. 
When we turned down their overt purchase order, the K.G.B. sent a covert 
agent into a Canadian company to steal the software; tipped off by 
Farewell, we added what geeks call a "Trojan Horse" to the pirated 
product… "The pipeline software that was to run the pumps, turbines, and 
valves was programmed to go haywire," writes Reed, "to reset pump 
speeds and valve settings to produce pressures far beyond those acceptable 
to the pipeline joints and welds. The result was the most monumental non-
nuclear explosion and fire ever seen from space." (Safire 2004) 
The devastating events of September 11, 2001 changed how the world looked at 
security in general. Daily life routines have been altered permanently. Security for public 
and government infrastructures has never received such intense scrutiny as before. 
Governments worldwide are all eager to prevent such horrific incidents from ever 
happening again. Likewise, security in Cyberspace has also received significant 
attentions. In his letter to the United States citizens and as a foreword for The National 
Strategy to Secure Cyberspace (NSTSC 2003), President George Bush highlighted the 
importance of engaging and empowering Americans to secure the portions of cyberspace 
that they own, operate, control, or with which they interact. He mentioned that securing 
cyberspace is a difficult strategic challenge that requires coordinated and focused effort 
from the entire society, the federal government, state and local governments, the private 
sector, and the American people. The following are extracts from his letter: 
The way business is transacted, government operates, and national defense 
is conducted have changed. These activities now rely on an interdependent 
network of information technology infrastructures called cyberspace. The 
National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace provides a framework for 
protecting this infrastructure that is essential to our economy, security, and 
way of life.  
Securing cyberspace is an extraordinarily difficult strategic challenge that 
requires a coordinated and focused effort from our entire society—the 
federal government, state and local governments, the private sector, and 
the American people.  
The cornerstone of America’s cyberspace security strategy is and will 
remain a public-private partnership. The federal government invites the 
creation of, and participation in, public-private partnerships to implement 
this strategy. Only by acting together can we build a more secure future in 
cyberspace.  (NSTSC 2003) 
9The future of cyber security will be dependent on the cooperative effort and 
actions from individual organizations, vendors of computer systems, and policy makers. 
 
B. COMPUTER SECURITY AWARENESS AND TRAINING 
With the extensive use of computing resources in the running of their businesses 
or operations, most organizations are compelled to employ an Information Security 
Specialist or IT Manager in an effort to ensure business or operational continuity. 
Although these IT specialists are considered the frontline in the organization’s defense of 
information security and risk management, it is sine quo non that achieving information 
security requires effort by all personnel in the organization. Just a single, untrained end-
user is needed to defeat any well thought-out and well-executed security strategy adopted 
by the organization. All personnel must be aware of their responsibility and obligation to 
their organization’s information security policies and procedures. Organization-wide 
awareness of information security can only be achieved by providing a constant and 
consistent information security educational program to all personnel.  
The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace NSTSC (2003) identified cyberspace 
security awareness and training programs as one of the five national priorities. The 
following extracts from NSTSC discussed the importance of end-user training to 
cyberspace security: 
Many information-system vulnerabilities exist because of a lack of 
cyberspace security awareness on the part of computer users, systems 
administrators, technology developers, procurement officials, auditors, 
chief information officers, chief executive officers, and corporate boards. 
These vulnerabilities can present serious risks to the infrastructures - even 
if they are not actually part of the infrastructure itself. A lack of trained 
personnel and the absence of widely accepted, multi-level certifications 
for personnel further complicate the task of reducing vulnerabilities. The 
National Cyberspace Security Awareness and Training Program will raise 
cyber-security awareness in companies, government agencies, universities, 
and among the Nation’s computer users. It will further address shortfalls 
in the numbers of trained and certified cyber-security personnel. (NSTSC 
2003) 
The problem with education and training in computer security is that it is often 
viewed as mundane and boring for both the users and administrators (Irvine 2003, 1). 
Computer security is an ever-evolving and complex topic, which the traditional 
10
pedagogical ways of security education often fail to drive home in the intended lessons. 
Security seminars and formal classes describing security policies and technologies are 
usually not appropriate for the average end-users and are often beyond their grasps. IT 
managers’ PowerPoint briefs on security awareness are often treated by end-users as 
boring and a waste of time and may not result in the appreciation of their obligations and 
responsibilities to be part of the overall security scheme. 
The problem now is to find a security training tool that will interest the targeted 
audiences, and at the same time satisfy security training requirements. Will the solution 
to the above problem lie in the form of an interactive commercial-quality video game that 
has a security oriented theme? Would a security training tool that can be readily 
configured to simulate real world security issues be useful? Would a tool that can be 
scaled to train computer security personnel, from entry-level to experts, be helpful? 
 
C. CYBERCIEGE AS AN IDEAL COMPUTER SECURITY EDUCATIONAL 
TOOL 
As described in Irvine (2005, 2), effective information security requires both a 
practical and tacit understanding of the science and art of security engineering. 
Laboratory experiments can help convey these concepts, but a wide range of large-scale, 
realistic experiments would be too costly for most classrooms. Simulations thus provide a 
helpful alternative.  
‘’CyberCIEGE is a high-end, commercial-quality video game developed jointly 
by Rivermind and the Naval Postgraduate School’s Center for Information Systems 
Security Studies and Research. This dynamic, extensible game adheres to IA principles to 
help teach key concepts and practices’’ (Irvine 2005, 2). It is a resource management 
simulation that attempts to model real-world security vulnerabilities. The game player is 
required to act and decide on IT related issues in a virtual IT-dependent organization. In 
order to meet the game objective, the player has to ensure the happiness and productivity 
of his virtual users in the organization while providing the necessary security measures to 
protect the organization’s valuable and vulnerable information assets. The player’s 
choices and decisions on procedural, technical, and physical security will determine 




Figure 1.   CyberCIEGE game play screenshot 
 
The main idea behind CyberCIEGE is that security concepts that are considered 
by some as mundane and boring can be taught in a more effective and entertaining 
manner. The following quotations highlight some advantages of using computer games as 
learning tools: 
Games are attractive because they challenge players, require the use of 
imagination, and satisfy the player’s curiosity, thereby encouraging 
experiential and exploratory learning. The pedagogical advantages of 
games include their ability to motivate students and (they serve) as a 
vehicle for conveying a large body of information. (Kirriemuir 2002) 
In its latest effort, Microsoft is funding university projects that rewrite 
computer science curricula around something everyone knows students 
like: computer games. This year Microsoft awarded six universities a total 
of $480,000 to create new kinds of computer science courses in which 
students learn programming techniques using gaming software models. As 
part of the effort, teaching modules and entire courses will be offered free 
to the public in the company's Curriculum Repository… The goal has been 
to replace the earlier "drill-and-practice" methods of interactive learning 
with a new generation of pedagogical tools, for all educational levels and 
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in subjects ranging from science, mathematics, and engineering, to social 
sciences and humanities. (Angiolillo 2005) 
CyberCIEGE consists of three main elements used for the construction of game 
scenarios. The following descriptions of the CyberCIEGE elements are derived from 
Irvine (2005, 2). The interested reader is encouraged to follow up with detailed readings.  
1. Simulation Engine 
This is a game engine that provides CyberCIEGE with an artificial intelligence 
system, video-playback library, library, memory-management system, resource-
management, and real-time economic engine designed to support resource management 
simulations. 
2. Scenario-Definition Language 
This is a language used by CyberCIEGE scenario designers to express security-
related risk management trade-offs, which the simulation engine will interpret and 
present as a simulation.  
3. Scenario-Development Tool (SDT) 
This is a development tool that elevates scenario designers from the complexity of 
the scenario language syntax during development of CyberCIEGE scenario. It supports 
reusable libraries of scenario elements and includes tools for compiling, validating, and 
running newly constructed scenarios as simulations (Johns 2004). Figure 2 shows a 
typical screenshot from the scenario-development tool. 
 
 
Figure 2.   Scenario-Development Tool 
 
CyberCIEGE also comes with a video-enhanced encyclopedia covering a broad 
range of IA topics which the player can invoke anytime during game play to further his 
understanding of a particular security subject or a certain section of the game.  
The application of simulations or games for the purposes of teaching security 
concepts does not need to be restricted to the academic arena; any organization that 
requires an interactive and stimulating tool to teach or reinforce security concepts will 
find CyberCIEGE a useful security educational tool that is both entertaining and 
captivating for the end-users.  
 
D. INTEGRITY OF MILITARY COMPUTERS 
In today’s heavily-wired world, attacks on military computer systems are 
becoming a growing threat to a nation’s security. As mentioned in GAO (1996), at its 
simplest, these attacks would result in financial nuisance to the Defense department. At 
its worst, they can pose catastrophic threats to a nation’s security. Critical computing 
resources for targeting systems, weapons system development, logistical and financial 
elements of the military are potential targets for attacks by adversaries.  
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When military computer systems are connected to the Internet, they become 
particularly susceptible to attacks. The exposure to the estimated 958 million (NetStat 
2005) Internet users worldwide greatly increased the risks of unauthorized access to 
information and the potential disruption of critical services by malicious outsiders.  
An article in Federal Computer Week reported that United States military 
computer networks are under constant attacks from its adversaries: 
Defense and industry officials describe DOD networks as the Achilles' 
heel of the powerful U.S. military. Securing military networks is even 
more critical in an increasingly transformed military in which information 
is as much a weapon as tanks and assault rifles. DOD networks have been 
breached. Department officials acknowledged hackers attacked military 
networks almost 300 times in 2003 — sometimes by cyber Trojan horses, 
which can operate within an organization's network. DOD officials say 
intrusions reduced the military's operational capabilities in 2004. The pace 
of the attacks has accelerated as adversaries honed in on this perceived 
weakness. DOD tallied almost 75,000 incidents on department networks 
last year, the most ever. (FCW 2005) 
A year 2000 United States General Accounting Office (GAO) report highlighted 
that Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) was facing serious and pervasive problems 
in its agency-wide computer security program. The same report also reported a staggering 
increase in detected attacks on Defense Department networks and the need for federal 
government agencies to secure their critical computer system. The following are extracts:  
The fourth annual survey conducted by the Computer Security Institute in 
cooperation with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) showed an 
increase in computer security intrusions for the third year in a row. In 
addition, the Defense Information Systems Agency recently reported that a 
total of 22,144 attacks were detected on Defense Department networks last 
year, up from 5,844 in 1998. Recognizing the federal government’s 
increasing reliance on computer systems to perform its basic missions, it is 
imperative that agencies secure their critical computer systems and 
electronic data. (GAO 2000) 
In its quest to safeguard its information systems, the military will face the same 
risks and challenges as any other government or private sector organization that has 
heavy reliance on computer and information technology. The ever-increasing 
sophistication and creativity of the attackers and their tools add on to the challenge of 
precluding unauthorized users from compromising the confidentiality, integrity, or 
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availability of information systems. A total cut off from external networks or an absolute 
protection of the military information systems is neither practical nor affordable. Risk 
management and tradeoffs that take into consideration the magnitude of the threat, the 
value and sensitivity of the information to be protected, and the cost of protecting it must 
be made when adopting computer security solutions.  
The Battle of Tannenberg and the Battle of Midway, as discussed in an earlier 
section of the chapter, illustrated how the failure in ensuring secrecy of information can 
result in a dramatic change of fortunes for military forces. In both examples, the 
confidentiality of the military communication and information systems were 
compromised and these were key factors that shaped the outcome of both wars. Similarly, 
the loss of integrity in operation critical systems can also be disastrous as seen in the 
example of the “Farewell Dossier” campaign. The malicious software that was planted by 
adversaries triggered the destruction of the Trans-Siberian pipeline and led to the 
financial crippling of the Soviet Union. 
The significance of maintaining secrecy in information systems compared to the 
importance of ensuring the systems’ integrity had always been better illustrated in books 
and movies; hence, secrecy as a critical aspect in information assurance is better 
understood by the general readers. However, having both secrecy and integrity are of 
essence to achieving information assurance. This thesis focuses on illustrating the 
importance of maintaining the integrity of mission-critical systems in a military 
environment and will also highlight the consequences of compromising system integrity. 
Information security is, without doubt, critical to mission success and can 
seriously impact a nation’s security and survivability. With that understanding, we are 
left to question how nations and organizations are protecting their valuable computing 
resources and information assets.  
The United States Navy recently implemented new policies to restrict service 
personnel’s use of commercial, web-based email applications in an effort to mitigate the 
risk of attacks and to improve operation security. The following are quotations from 
DCMil (2005) that discussed the Navy’s new policies: 
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The Navy has begun enforcing policies set forth in its Information 
Technology User Acknowledgement Form by blocking access to Web-
based, commercial e-mail sites (webmail) from Department of the Navy-
funded networks. That means it's no longer possible for anyone using 
Navy information technology to access commercial webmail from 
providers such as Yahoo, Hotmail, AOL, and others. (DCMil 2005) 
“Navy Networks are a weapon system and must be defended with the 
same rigorous standards as other weapon systems," explained Vice Adm. 
James P. McArthur, commander, Naval Network Warfare Command 
(NETWARCOM). "People and mission are at risk without access to 
assured, secure, complete, accurate, and timely information." (DCMil 
2005) 
The restrictions on commercial webmail are necessary to protect the 
Navy's networks from multiple threats while maintaining operational 
security on all of its systems that are connected to the Department of 
Defense's Global Information Grid. (DCMil 2005) 
To a certain extent, denying access to web-based email can improve the overall 
security of the network. The end-users are blocked from opening malicious email 
attachments that could potentially harm the organization’s network. However, is that 
initiative enough to protect the network from the other multiple threats that exist on the 
Internet? How effective are the implementation of firewalls and gateways as cyber 
security solutions? Are firewalls and gateways strong enough to prevent intrusion into the 
organization’s network when it is connected to the Internet?  
It appears that the only infallible solution is to be completely shut out and 
disconnected from the Internet; however, this may not be practical as life today revolves 
so much around the Internet. A total disengagement from the Internet will result in a 
whole new set of issues. Is the solution to establish a network that is strictly reserved for 
Internet access only and completely separated from the organization’s backbone 
network? Will an air-gapped network architecture as a security solution defend against a 
determined attacker? Even with an air-gapped network architecture, the commercial 
software or other potentially malicious software that is residing on the network can still 




hardware devices that are not developed under a controlled environment is susceptible to 
compromise by determined adversaries or professional hackers with a nation’s resources 
at their disposal. 
Software and hardware devices of uncertain origin are definitely potential threats 
to the integrity of military and government systems, which are high value targets to 
adversaries. The ever increasing reliance on commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) 
technology operating on a broad array of military computer systems, which includes 
weapon systems, command and control systems, financial systems, personnel systems, 
payment systems, and other operational applications, is a cause of security concern. 
Although COTS technology does provide the advantages of lower development costs and 
access to frequent technology updates, its use will inevitably expose the defense software 
and systems to a great variety of local or even foreign suppliers and contractors. These 
greatly increase the risk of vulnerabilities exploitation and may cause serious security 
implications to a nation’s defense setup. The following extracts from IT Pro (2005) and 
GAO (2004) highlight some advantages of COTS and the potential security threats they 
may pose:  
Economically, outsourcing creates several advantages and incentives for 
US corporations. First, they enjoy significantly reduced labor costs. 
Skilled labor in a developing market can be significantly cheaper than 
comparable US labor. Considering that outsourced labor usually does not 
receive healthcare or retirement benefits, the labor savings to US 
corporations can be even greater. Second, outsourcing provides a constant 
and reliable labor supply in the host country that is largely immune to 
local, regional, or even national labor supply spikes and dips that affect the 
outsourcing nation’s labor market. Finally, outsourcing can create 
economies of scale that further drive down costs and save resources. (IT 
Pro 2005) 
Corporations must balance the benefits of outsourcing high-tech software 
development and application service provisioning against the costs, 
especially with regard to homeland security. (IT Pro 2005) 
DOD acquisition and software security policies do not fully address the 
risk of using foreign suppliers to develop weapon system software… other 
policies intended to mitigate information system vulnerabilities focus 




and unauthorized access to information systems, but not on insider threats, 
such as the insertion of malicious code by software developers. (GAO 
2004) 
As a System Administration Officer during a previous tour of duty in the 
Singapore Armed Forces (SAF), the author had the privilege of understanding and 
experiencing the challenges of managing a military unit’s computer information systems 
and networks. SAF’s choice of an air-gapped network for internal communications has 
the advantages of assuring secure information transfer between trusted systems and 
reducing vulnerabilities from outsider attacks; however, it also poses other interesting 
challenges such as the management of end-users’ need for transferring data to and from 
an external source and end-users’ desire to be connected to the host of services and 
resources available on the Internet. 
A part of this thesis will be dedicated to investigating, from the perspective of 
information assurance, the use of commercial software on an air-gapped network versus 
connecting the network to the Internet. In both cases, the subjection of the network to 
possible malicious acts by adversaries will be explored. Motivated by the author’s 
background, this thesis research aims to create a CyberCIEGE scenario that will mimic 
the real world challenges that a System Administration Officer in the Army will 
encounter while managing military information systems and networks. The scenario will 
focus primarily on the player maintaining the integrity of information system and 
networks in a military environment while supporting various end-users’ needs. This 
thesis will contribute to the overall objective of the CyberCIEGE project, to create an 
alternative to traditional Information Assurance (IA) training and education approaches 
by developing an interactive, entertaining commercial-grade PC-based computer game 
that teaches IA concepts while simultaneously entertaining the player. 
 
E. KEY CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS  
The following section provides definitions for key security concepts that are 
covered in this thesis. Understanding these key security concepts will allow readers to 
fully appreciate the security lessons brought forward by the CyberCIEGE scenario 
developed in this thesis. Unless stated otherwise, the majority of the definitions are 
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derived from the National Information Systems Security (INFOSEC) Glossary (NSTISSI 
4009), published by the National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems 
Security Committee of the United States federal government to provide a common 
vocabulary for discussing INFOSEC. 
1. Information Assurance (IA)  
Information operations (IO) that protect and defend information and 
information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, 
authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation. This includes 
providing for restoration of information systems by incorporating 
protection, detection, and reaction capabilities. (NSTISSI 4009) 
2. Computer Security 
Measures and controls that ensure confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability of IS assets including hardware, software, firmware, and 
information being processed, stored, and communicated. (NSTISSI 4009) 
3. Information Systems Security (INFOSEC and/or ISS) 
Protection of information systems against unauthorized access to or 
modification of information, whether in storage, processing or transit, and 
against the denial of service to authorized users, including those measures 
necessary to detect, document, and counter such threats. (NSTISSI 4009) 
4. Confidentiality 
Assurance that information is not disclosed to unauthorized persons, 
processes, or devices. (NSTISSI 4009) 
5. Integrity  
Quality of an information system (IS) reflecting the logical correctness 
and reliability of the operating system; the logical completeness of the 
hardware and software implementing the protection mechanisms; and the 
consistency of the data structures and occurrence of the stored data. Note 
that in a formal security mode, integrity is interpreted more narrowly to 
mean protection against unauthorized modification or destruction of 
information. (NSTISSI 4009) 
6. Availability 
Timely, reliable access to data and information services for authorized 




7. Network System 
System implemented with a collection of interconnected components. A 
network system is based on a coherent security architecture and design. 
(NSTISSI 4009) 
8. Internet 
A global network connecting millions of computers. More than 100 countries are 
linked into exchanges of data, news, and opinions. Unlike online services, which are 
centrally controlled, the Internet is decentralized by design. Each Internet computer, 
called a host, is independent. Its operators can choose which Internet services to use and 
which local services to make available to the global Internet community. Remarkably, 
this anarchy by design works exceedingly well. There are a variety of ways to access the 
Internet. Most online services, such as America Online, offer access to some Internet 
services. It is also possible to gain access through a commercial Internet Service Provider 
(ISP). The Internet is not synonymous with World Wide Web. (Webopedia 2005) 
9. Intranet 
A network based on TCP/IP protocols (an internet) belonging to an 
organization, usually a corporation, accessible only by the organization's 
members, employees, or others with authorization. An intranet's Web sites 
look and act just like any other Web sites, but the firewall surrounding an 
intranet fends off unauthorized access. (Webopedia 2005) 
10. Air-gapped Network 
A network of interconnected components that implements both physical and 
logical separation from any other external network. Isolation is used to keep the flow of 
information within the interconnected components and reduce the risk of network 
vulnerability exploitation by outsiders. When the risks and consequences of attacks by 
adversaries are high, organizations such as government agencies and defense departments 
with interconnected systems that are sensitive or pertain to national security will often 
choose to adopt the air-gapped network architecture to isolate these systems from any 
other external networks such as the Internet.  
 
F. SUMMARY 
Securing information systems and networks is a complex and constantly evolving 
challenge. It requires the close collaboration of all concerned parties, from individual 
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end-users to policy makers, in order to have any chance of success. The importance of 
information security in military operations can never be overstated, and history has borne 
witness to numerous occasions where the success or failure of a campaign rested solely 
on the secured exchange of information. In this chapter, CyberCIEGE has also been 
depicted as a security training tool that can contribute to improving cyber security, and 
ultimately, may provide a more secure environment for information exchange. The 
background information and ideas provided in this chapter will act as guiding principles 
and motivations for the subsequent development of a CyberCIEGE scenario that will 
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III. SCENARIO STRATEGY 
This chapter discusses how CyberCIEGE can be used as a security educational 
tool to improve the security awareness level of personnel in an organization that has 
demanding needs for integrity of operational critical networks. The chapter will look at 
how CyberCIEGE can be used to teach security topics such as the importance of having 
physical security and the importance of software integrity for mission-critical systems in 
a military environment. This chapter also explores how CyberCIEGE can be used to 
simulate the tension between end-users’ desire for Internet connections and the 
organization’s need to protect its sensitive networks through its choice of an air-gapped, 
network architecture.  
 
A. EDUCATIONAL FOCUS 
As discussed in the Chapter II, just a single, untrained end-user is needed to 
compromise any well thought-out and well-executed security strategy adopted by an 
organization. In the context of a military environment, poor security awareness and 
training can be catastrophic. Therefore, having a security-educated workforce is vital for 
the military. 
The following extracts from an article in Federal Computer Week indicated the 
United States DOD’s budgeting concerns regarding IT and national security systems:  
DOD's fiscal 2006 budget contains $30.1 billion for IT and national 
security systems, according to GEIA's budget forecast. The defense IT 
budget will grow to $34.8 billion in fiscal 2011, but defense industry 
analysts at the conference warned that DOD plans to start few new 
projects in an environment defined by streamlining and consolidation… 
Defense vendors that succeed in the future will be those that offer 
innovative approaches to slow or stop increases in DOD's operations and 
maintenance costs… (FCW3 2005) 
With tight budget controls, resources that can be allocated to IA security training 
efforts will also be limited. As such, CyberCIEGE is ideally positioned to provide an 
innovative yet cost effective means of IA security training to DOD personnel. 
 
24
The flexibility of CyberCIEGE’s game engine and scenario definition tool (SDT) 
will allow the creation of scenarios to meet a broad range of audiences and trainees. 
Scenarios may be custom-built to train and improve the IA security knowledge of policy 
makers, IT personnel, and end-users, thus raising the overall IA awareness level of 
organizations. 
The CyberCIEGE scenario developed for this thesis will focus on illustrating the 
importance of maintaining the integrity of mission-critical systems in a military 
environment. The game scenario will also highlight the consequences that can result from 
compromising the integrity of these mission-critical systems. The sections to follow will 
describe how the tools and elements in CyberCIEGE can be used to build a scenario that 
covey these security concepts and lessons to players in a military environment.  
 
B. SCENARIO STRUCTURED TO ACHIEVE EDUCATIONAL GOALS 
The scenario was organized into a series of phases, each having one or more 
objectives that focus on a particular security educational goal. The following sections will 
describe the scenario design strategies used to illustrate and convey to the player the 
importance of maintaining physical security, hardware and software integrity for 
sensitive systems, and the need to maintain an air-gapped network architecture to protect 
a sensitive network. 
 
C. USING CYBERCIEGE TO ILLUSTRATE THE IMPORTANCE OF 
MAINTAINING PHYSICAL SECURITY  
Physical access into military facilities is usually controlled and monitored by 
guards and security personnel. The backgrounds of personnel working in these facilities 
are checked and they are considered trusted agents of the organization. Nevertheless, 
when access to operational systems with critical assets is not correctly restricted, there is 
still a possibility that the systems and assets will be unintentionally corrupted by ‘trusted’ 
insiders who are not proficiently trained. Therefore, adopting the right, physical security 
measures is fundamental to achieving information security. 
 
Figure 3 illustrates a situation in which a workstation that holds critical assets on 
its local hard drive is placed in an area where there is little or no access control policies 
(i.e. an unsecured zone). With such an arrangement, it is inevitable that the workstation 
will be exposed to a variety of personnel with different clearance levels. This could 
subject the workstation and its mission-critical assets to possible corruption either by 
insiders who may have malicious intent or just through unintentional user negligence. 
The solution to this situation will be to move the workstation to an area with the right 
physical security measures and to enforce strict access control policies (i.e. a secured 
zone). This will minimize the exposure of the workstation and its critical assets to 





Figure 3.   Situation One -Workstation in unsecured zone 
 
In the second situation as shown in Figure 4, a workstation in an unsecured zone 
is assessing mission-critical assets that are held by a server in a secured zone. Although 
the mission-critical assets are now residing on a server in a secured zone, such an 
arrangement can still potentially expose the assets to possible corruption by unauthorized 
personnel that have physical access to the connected workstation in the unsecured zone. 
To solve this security problem, will it be enough to just move the workstation to the 
secured area? 
  
Figure 4.   Situation Two – Mission-critical assets on server 
 
Figure 5 shows a proposed solution to the security problem illustrated in Figure 4; 
however, it seems as though this solution is not a foolproof one. The existence of the wall 
socket (i.e. CAT 5 or RJ-45 socket) could still be a potential vulnerability to the integrity 
of the mission-critical assets that are on the server in the secured zone. Unless this access 
point is physically removed or blocked, it can still be used by anyone in the unsecured 
zone for connecting another computer and gaining access to the server. Unauthorized 
personnel with malicious intent and motivations can potentially compromise the integrity 




Figure 5.   Access point that could be a potential vulnerability. 
 
A CyberCIEGE scenario can be built to portray the above situations and teach the 
player the importance of adopting the right physical security measures to protect the 
organization’s mission-critical assets. The following section will describe the main 
CyberCIEGE components and elements that can be used to create a game scenario that 
will be able to mimic real life, physical security dilemmas and can be used to teach the 
player the appropriate security lessons.   
A military logistics planning facility will be used as the backdrop for the scenario. 
The first phase of the scenario will start with the situation as illustrated in Figure 4. In 
this phase, the player will encounter a user who is in an area of the facility that is 
accessible to all personnel (i.e. an unsecured zone), working on a mission-critical asset, 
hosted by a server that is located in a secured zone with strict access control. To succeed 
in this phase, the player will have to provide the user with secured access to the server 
that is hosting the critical asset in order to protect this asset from being compromised. 
Secured access to the server can only be achieved via a LAN connection from a 
workstation that is also housed within the secured zone. To protect the integrity of the 
asset, the player will also need to ensure that there are no other network connections to 




1. Scenario Briefings and Objectives 
At the start of the CyberCIEGE game, the player is provided with a brief 
description of what is to be expected in the current scenario. Together with the objective 
description, scenario designers can indicate to the player what needs to be done to 
successfully complete the scenario. Message triggers can also be set to provide to the 
player hints and lessons learned if so desired.  
In this scenario, the player will be told that he/she is the newly appointed IT 
manger of HQ 368 Logistic Command and his/her first objective is to ensure that all 
mission-critical assets in the facility are secured. Message triggers will also be used to 
trigger pop-ups that will show greeting messages and will introduce the key characters of 
the game to the player. 
2. Zone 
The CyberCIEGE game scenarios will consist of user accessible areas that can be 
partitioned into individual zones with different security attributes. The access to these 
zones can be controlled by setting the zone access list during game play or with the SDT. 
Similarly, physical security measures such as having a guard at the entrance to the zone, 
installing an expensive alarm, or having an iris scanner in the zone etc. can be set to 
reflect the different levels of physical security for the zones.   
The scenario will consist of two main zones. For simplicity and clarity, the zone 
that is accessible by all users will be described as the unsecured zone, while the zone that 
has an access control list and is only accessible to users with a higher security clearance 
level will be known as the secured zone. The player will not be required to adjust the 
access lists or the enforcement mechanisms in the zones.  The player cannot succeed by 
restricting access to the entire site because that will prevent one of the users, an 
administrative assistant with a lower security level, from accessing the zones and 
completing a future objective.  
3. Asset 
Assets, such as a mission-critical plan, can be created using the SDT and set to 
reside on workstations or servers in the game scenarios. The parameters of these assets, 
which include the costs resulting from the asset being attacked, the potential attackers, 
the attack motive level etc., can be set to reflect the different values or worth of the assets 
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to the organization and potential attackers. This will also result in different levels of 
attack motivation and will determine the levels of sophistication of the game engine 
attempts to compromise the assets.  
To attract potentially, successful attacks, an asset with a high modification motive 
is defined.  A Logistic Operation Plan is created as the mission-critical asset for this 
scenario. When the scenario starts, this asset will reside on a server within the secured 
zone and will be accessed by a user with a workstation that is in the unsecured zone. This 
setup can potentially expose the asset to users who do not have sufficiently high security 
clearances or who have low or no training; thus, resulting in the possible corruption of the 
asset. The player will have to learn this security lesson in order to succeed in this 
scenario; he/she will have to ensure that adequate physical security is accorded to this 
mission-critical asset.  
4. User 
Scenario designers can use the SDT to create users with different levels of 
trustworthiness and who will be assigned to work on goals. 
A user in this game scenario will be given a goal that can only be satisfied by 
having access to the Logistics Operation Plan, a high integrity asset, as described in the 
previous section.  The scenario will be designed such that the user will not have direct 
access to the server that hosts this asset; thus, the player will need to identify a zone that 
provides adequate physical security to house a workstation for securely accessing the 
asset via a LAN connection to the server.  Most users in this game scenario will have 
clearances that include background checks to ensure the users’ trustworthiness.  At least 
one user will lack this clearance and background check.  This user will have no 
authorized reason to access the Logistic Operation Plan, but because of low 
trustworthiness and low training level, this user may seek to compromise the asset.  This 
user will also be given a specific motive to modify and corrupt the asset when it is 
exposed or becomes available in a zone that is accessible by him/her. The player may be 
able to increase the training level and trustworthiness of users by buying training and 




these aspects of the scenario, a budget constraint will be imposed. The limited fund 
available to the player will prevent him/her from buying training or getting background 
checks for any of the users.  
5. Attack Triggers 
Attack triggers provided by CyberCIEGE can be set to control the type and 
frequency of attacks on assets in the game. The game engine will also provide random 
attacks on the assets based on the motivation level of potential attackers. 
The objective of this scenario is to convey security lessons on maintaining the 
integrity of military systems; thus, the attack triggers will seek to corrupt the assets rather 
than disclose them.  Two main attack trigger types are used: one that triggers an insider’s 
attempt to corrupt an asset and another that triggers malicious software to corrupt an 
asset. 
6. Money 
This can be used as a performance index to indicate how well the player is 
playing the scenario. It can be a reward for adopting the right security procedures in the 
game or as a penalty for failing to provide the right security measures in a given situation.   
The player will start the game with limited funds so that unnecessary or undesired 
changes to the game aspects can be prevented – such as increasing trustworthiness and 
training levels of users.  
 
D. COTS HARDWARE ISSUES IN A SENSITIVE ENVIRONMENT 
As discussed in Chapter II, commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) technology can be 
an attractive option in terms of cost effectiveness and the access to frequent technology 
updates. However, when such hardware devices, which may be of unknown origin, are 
deployed in a sensitive environment, the resulting consequences can be potentially 
catastrophic. A classic example is the “Farewell Dossier” campaign as discussed earlier. 
CyberCIEGE does not specifically provide a function to set the integrity level of 
hardware devices in the game. Nevertheless, a combination of setting the platform, 
integrity level, and the type of software applications residing on the machines can be used 
to simulate the use of COTS technology and mimic the potential problem that can arise 
from their use. 
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As described in the previous section, to achieve the users’ goals, the player must 
provide workstations for the users to work on their assigned tasks. In this phase of the 
scenario, the player must provide a second user access to the Logistics Operation Plan 
that is residing on the server. To achieve this objective, the player will need to purchase a 
workstation so that the second user can work on the asset in a secured zone. Four 
workstations with different attributes to portray different levels of hardware integrity will 
be made available from which the users may choose. To succeed, the player will need to 
buy the user a workstation that has the right integrity, house it in the secured zone, and 
connect it to the server via the LAN connection to access the asset.  
1. Components 
Components in the CyberCIEGE game are used for storing and accessing assets 
by the users. Scenario designers can use the SDT to create a list of devices in the 
component catalogue to provide choices for the players when purchasing devices in the 
game’s Buy Screen. These devices may be configured with a variety of OSs and base 
platforms that are of different integrity levels. A brief description of the devices in the 
Buy Screen of the game can also be included to guide or trick the player into making 
choices on his/her purchase. Devices that are configured with low integrity OSs or 
platforms will be more susceptible to attacks.   
The player will be given a choice of four workstations in this scenario. The first is 
a lowly priced, basic workstation that is of a low integrity platform and installed with 
freeware. The second option is a high-end workstation with a low integrity platform that 
is bundled with both commercial software and freeware. The third option is an expensive 
workstation that has a trusted platform and was developed under a strict environment. 
The final option is a mid-priced, thin, client workstation that is on a trusted platform and 
without any software installed.  
In the real world, an end-user’s preference may, at times, sway the decision to 
acquire a particular system or device for the organization. In this scenario, message 
triggers that state the user’s preference for the workstation will be added to entice the 




decision for a sensitive environment. To succeed, the player will have to select either of 
the last two described workstations, which have high integrity platforms that lack the 
extraneous, low integrity applications. 
2. Attack Triggers 
As described earlier, two main attack trigger types will be used in the scenario to 
trigger an insider’s attempt to corrupt the asset and to trigger malicious software attacks 
on the asset. These attacks will succeed in corrupting the asset when the player makes a 
poor choice by purchasing a workstation of a low integrity platform with software 
applications of unknown origin installed and connects it to the server. 
 
E. SOFTWARE INTEGRITY IN A SENSITIVE ENVIRONMENT 
As mentioned previously COTS technology does have its advantages and 
disadvantages. Software that is of unknown origin has the potential to create havoc when 
installed on sensitive military systems. Commercial software products are usually just a 
fraction of the price of those that are developed under controlled environments. Often, 
they are also packed with richer features and may have better functionality, making them 
more appealing to the end-users. Therefore, when deciding on which software 
applications to acquire for use in a sensitive environment, factors such as cost, features 
available, end-users’ preference, potential risks of sabotage etc. have to be weighed and 
taken into consideration before making the acquisition. 
After the player has successfully deployed the high integrity workstation 
platforms in a physically secured zone and provided secure access to the Logistics 
Operational Plan for the user, the next phase of the scenario will introduce a need for a 
specific type of application that is developed within a secured environment. The player 
will need to acquire a logistics management software application in order to allow the 
users to meet their task objectives.  
The player will be presented with three choices of logistics management software 
applications, each with a different set of security attributes and integrity level. The first 
option is a mid-priced, commercial logistics management software that is popular with 
the industry users and provides extensive features. The second option is a reasonably 
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priced, easy to use logistics software application that is highly favored by the military 
users. The third and final option is an expensive logistic management software that is 
developed under a controlled environment.  
To complete this phase, the player will have to help the users accomplish their 
user goals by acquiring the high integrity, logistics management software. Purchasing the 
two software applications that are of lower integrity and installing them on the high 
integrity machines could potentially corrupt the mission-critical asset on the server. When 
deciding on the choice of software application to acquire, the player will have to weigh 
three key factors: the cost of the software application, user’s preference, and sensitivity of 
the environment in which the application will be installed. 
This phase of the scenario will demonstrate to the player that in order to achieve 
information security, it is also important to ensure the integrity of the software 
applications that are running on the systems.  
1. Software 
CyberCIEGE has a set of predefined software products with different levels of 
integrity. Scenario designers can use the SDT to make these software products available 
for purchase by the player in the game. A brief description of these software products can 
be found in the CyberCIEGE encyclopedia which will provide the player with the 
required information for making his/her acquisition choices. Software products that are of 
low integrity can be potentially malicious and will increase the systems’ susceptibility to 
attacks when installed.   
As mentioned in the previous section, this scenario will introduce the need for the 
player to acquire a specific software application type that is of a high integrity level for 
use in a sensitive environment to satisfy the users’ goals. Three different choices of the 
software application will be available for purchase by the player during the game. These 
software applications will be available in two forms: high integrity and low integrity. The 
descriptions of these software applications can be found in the CyberCIEGE 




2. Message Triggers 
As described earlier, message triggers can be set to trigger dialogue boxes which 
will illustrate the users’ thoughts to the player during the game play. In this scenario, the 
message triggers will be used to invoke dialogue boxes that indicate the users’ preference 
of software products. These messages from the users are aimed at influencing the player’s 
decisions and will try to entice him/her to buy the software application that is preferred 
by the users - which may not be the right choice for the organization. 
3. Money 
There will be limited funds available to the player so as to mimic real life budget 
constraints that the player may encounter when purchasing software for the organization. 
The cost of the software applications will also be a factor that is used to influence the 
player’s choice of software product to acquire. 
 
F. AIR-GAPPED NETWORK ARCHITECTURE VERSUS NEED FOR 
INTERNET ACCESS 
An air-gapped network architecture is a good way to reduce the organization’s 
exposure from network vulnerabilities and a good way to protect its connected systems 
from outsider attacks. Implementing such network architecture will also mean forgoing 
connection to the Internet and access to valuable resources on the Web. This will likely 
create tension between end-users who desire access to the Internet and the organization’s 
decision to disallow it. As discussed in the previous chapter, the solution could be to 
establish a network that is strictly reserved for Internet access only and completely 
separated from the organization’s air-gapped backbone network. 
With CyberCIEGE’s rich set of functions and tools coupled with some 
imagination and creativeness from scenario designers, it is possible to develop a game 
scenario that can teach trainees security lessons based on the above described situation.  
This last phase of the scenario will introduce the tension that is created when there 
is a need for users to be able to access the Internet while working in a sensitive 
environment. One of the users working in the secured zone and using a high integrity 
system platform and network will require access to an asset (i.e. Logistics Research Data) 
that can only be created with a connection to the Internet. Connecting the high integrity 
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systems and network to the Internet to create the Logistic Research Data will potentially 
expose the sensitive systems and network to malicious software and attackers, corrupting 
the mission-critical asset (i.e. Logistics Operation Plan) that is residing on the sensitive 
network.  
To succeed in this phase, the player will have to help the user achieve the goal by 
creating a separate network that will be connected to the Internet. Another user will be 
tasked to work on the Logistics Research Data from a system that is connected to the 
Internet. Once the asset is created, it will be transferred onto the sensitive, air-gapped 
operation network via a dedicated system. This strict control of information transfer from 
the Internet to the sensitive network will help to ensure the integrity of the sensitive 
network. 
1. Asset 
An asset, Logistics Research Data, will be created when a user is able to work on 
a workstation that is connected to the Internet. This asset will be subsequently transferred 
to the high sensitivity, air-gapped network via a dedicated system that is connected to the 
air-gapped network. 
2. Networks 
CyberCIEGE provides the option for establishing multiple networks in the game. 
Scenario designers can use the SDT to create different networks for the scenarios.  
This phase will require the player to form a separate network from the sensitive 
operational network in order to allow one of the users to access the Internet and create the 
Logistic Research Data.  
3. Message Triggers 
At the start of this phase, one of the users working in the secured zone will want 
to connect to the Internet. This request is conveyed to the player through the dialogue 
boxes activated by the message triggers, portraying the users’ thoughts. 
4. Conditions 
CyberCIEGE provides the AssetToNetworkByFilterType condition which 
scenario designers can use to check for a network connection to a particular asset. In this 
scenario, when the player connects the sensitive network to the Internet for the first time, 
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this condition will trigger a warning message to warn the player of the danger of his 
action. A subsequent violation will set off the game-losing trigger (i.e. LoseTrigger). 
 
G. SUMMARY 
This chapter has discussed how CyberCIEGE components and its game engine 
were explored to create game scenarios, mimicking real life information security issues, 
and used for conveying security lessons to a wide audience of trainees. The strategies for 
employing these CyberCIEGE elements to educate players on the importance of having 
physical security, hardware and software integrity, and how an air-gapped network 
architecture can enhance the security of operational critical systems in a military 
environment were also discussed in this chapter. The possibilities and variety of game 
scenarios that can be created are limited only by the game designers’ imaginations. The 
next chapter will describe the results of using the strategies discussed in this chapter to 
implement a CyberCIEGE scenario that will illustrate the importance of maintaining 
systems integrity in a military environment. 
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IV. SCENARIO DESCRIPTION 
As part of this thesis research, Operation Artemis, a CyberCIEGE scenario 
definition file (SDF), is developed to mimic real-world security issues encountered by 
military system administrators and to illustrate to players the importance of maintaining 
system integrity in a military environment. This chapter describes in detail the 
implementation of the scenario strategies as discussed in Chapter III. The objective is to 
create a SDF that can be used to convey security lessons about the need of having 
software integrity and an air-gapped network architecture in a sensitive military 
environment. 
 
A.  SCENARIO SETTINGS 
This section will describe the CyberCIEGE game environment the players will 
encounter while playing the scenario.  
The backdrop of the scenario is the army logistics command headquarters of the 
Republic of Alliswell, a fictitious nation. The player will be taking on the role of LT 
Norman P. Smith who was recently appointed IT manager of the logistics command 
headquarters, HQ 368 Logistics Command, Alliswell Armed Forces (AAF). 
1.  Initial Briefing 
When the game is invoked, the following narratives will provide the context of 
the scenario and inform the player of his/her role in the game: 
Welcome LT Norman P. Smith! We received your posting order and were 
expecting your arrival. 
You are now the IT manger of HQ 368 Logistics Command. The security of the 
information systems and networks in the command is your responsibility. 
We have heard good things about you from your previous command and we are 
expecting nothing less than your best here. 
Proceed to the [Game] tab for a full briefing and instructions.  
Good Luck Soldier! 
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2.  Full Description 
When the player activates the ‘Game’ tab, he/she will be presented with a more 
in-depth description of scenario settings. The following are the narratives: 
Good Day LT Norman P. Smith! 
You have been appointed IT manager of HQ 368 Logistics Command, Alliswell 
Armed Forces (AAF). 
The Republic of Alliswell is an island state 1° North of the equator in the Pacific. 
It has a population of 150 million and is one of the major economic powers in the world. 
The country has one of the best equipped and high-tech armed forces. Recent 
developments in the global war on terrorism has seen Alliswell deploying a huge number 
of troops in support of the allied forces’ effort against insurgencies in the Middle Eastern 
state of Qari. 
HQ 368 Logistics Command is the overall coordinator of logistical support 
efforts for AAF’s operation in Qari. This is an important unit which manages the 
distribution of transportation, food and munitions supplies among the forces fighting in 
the frontline. The unit operates a sophisticated state of the art logistics management 
system from its home base, known as ARILS (AAF Real-time Integrated Logistics 
System). The system has real time links to the frontline troops and allows the monitoring 
and coordination of the forces’ logistics assets. HQ 368 Logistics Command‘s operation 
is vital to the success of AAF’s effort in Qari. 
The game is organized into 5 phases Click on [Objectives] to see what they are. 
Press "e" at any time to view the CyberCIEGE encyclopedia, which includes a 
"How To" section. 
Press “k” to view the shortcut and navigation keys. 
Click the "OFFICE" tab and then click on the red button (upper right) to begin 
play. 
Good Luck Soldier! 
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3.  Introduction of Users 
At the start of the game, the player will be introduced to the four key characters in 
the scenario. SpeakTrigger is the trigger class used to invoke dialogue boxes that will 
provide a brief introduction and greeting messages to the player. The following are the 
messages: 
Greetings from MAJ Charles Carson: 
We have been expecting you LT Smith. I'm MAJ Charles Carson, Welcome to HQ 
368 Logistics Command. Click on me to find out more. 
Greetings from WO Henry Hector: 
Welcome Sir! I'm WO Henry Hector, looking forward to working with you. Click 
on me to learn more. 
Greetings from SGT Uri Anson: 
Hi Sir! I'm SGT Uri Anson, I'm the IT assistant of the command. Click me to learn 
more. 
Greetings from Ms Aida Young: 
Hi Sir! Nice to meet you. I'm Aida, the new admin assistant. This is my first day 
on the job too! 
  
B.  ZONE LAYOUT 
The scenario consists of six user-accessible areas that are partitioned into two 
main security zones, a secured zone and an unsecured zone, as described in Chapter III. 
The layout of HQ 368 Logistics command is shown in Figure 6. 
 
 
Figure 6.   Layout of HQ 368 Logistics Command. 
 
Table 1 provides the descriptions of the different zones in the game scenario. It 
also shows the physical security attributes of each zone, users who are granted access to 
the zones, and the networks that are available in each zone. Players can click on the 
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Table 1. Scenario Zones Descriptions. 
 
C.  USERS AND USER GOALS 
As described earlier, there are four main characters in the scenario. These 
characters are assigned goals that they will try to meet in different phases of the game. 
The player’s decisions during the game will affect and determine the ways these 
characters carry out their tasks. Their levels of success in achieving the assigned goals 
depends on the correctness of the player handling the given security situations. 
Table 2 describes these four main characters and their assigned goals in the 
scenario. This information will be provided to the player when the ‘USER’ tab is invoked 
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Commander of ARILS.  
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Level User Goals 
 
 
He is techno-savvy and 
enjoys working around 
computers and servers. 
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to Operation Commander 
of ARILS. 
 
Ms Young is a newly 
hired civilian. 
 
She is a fresh graduate of 
Alliswell National 
University and this is her 
first job. 
 
Restricted Phase 4: Aida_Work_on_WebResearch 
 
 
Table 2. Scenario Characters and Goals Descriptions. 
 
D.  COMPONENT CATALOG 
The second phase of the scenario requires the player to purchase computer 
peripherals for WO Henry Hector. The devices available for acquisition will differ in 
terms of function, price, and integrity level. This will allow the player to experience the 
real-world dilemma of having to make the right acquisition choice in a given security 
situation while working with a limited budget.  The choice of the purchase will reflect the 
player’s appreciation of the security situation and lessons. 
Table 3 provides the description of the devices available for purchase by the 
player. The component descriptions will be shown in the ‘Buy’ screen when the player 




Name Deal Basic 
Component 
Descriptions 
Voted budget PC of the year by popular 
computer magazine, COMPView. This PC is 
bundled with a variety of freeware. 
Base 
Component Lunitos AFOS 
Operating 












Name Deal Pro V 
Component 
Descriptions 
The professional's choice! By popular PC brand 
Deal, this PC comes with excellent customer 
service support. A full suite of software is also 
bundled with this PC. 
Base 
Component Blato Desktop Select 
Operating 















Name Gell Mil 
Component 
Descriptions 
Jointly developed by Alliswell Armed Forces and 
local defense contractors. Certified for military 
use. 
Base 











Name Gell Cool 
Component 
Descriptions 
Great looking workstation by a local company. 
No software is bundled with this PC. 
Base 












Name MIB Green Warrior 
Component 
Descriptions 
A server jointly developed by Alliswell Armed 
Forces and MIB, a local defense contractor. 
Certified for military use. 
Base 










Name Gell Cool 
Component 
Descriptions 
This is a high performance router by ConNEX. 
Voted reader's choice in COMPView. 
Base 






 Cost $2000 
 
 






E.  SOFTWARE COMPONENTS 
The player will be required to purchase a logistics supply chain management 
software application in the third phase of the game. The following sections will describe 
the three software products available for purchase. These descriptions are available to the 
player when he/she activates the CyberCIEGE encyclopedia.  
The player has to make a choice between the following three logistics supply 
chain management software products: 
1. Agile 2005  
Description:  This is a mid-priced commercial logistics software package. It 
provides extensive logistics management functions and is very popular with industry 
users. The company that produces Agile 2005 has a reputable and trustworthy technical 
support team. It also has a website that provides constant updates for its products.  
2. SureRight Pro 
Description:  This is a reasonably priced and easy to use logistics software 
package. It provides functions that support military logistics planning processes and thus, 
is highly favored by military users. The company that produces SureRight Pro is a 
reputable local company and is listed on the local stock exchange. 
3. LogOn  
Description:  A logistics management software package that is developed under a 
strictly controlled environment for the military. To be able to fully exploit LogOn’s rich 
logistics management features, users have to undergo a three weeks training package. 
Due to its stringent validation process, LogOn is one of the most expensive logistics 
software applications available. 
 
F. MANDATORY POLICIES 
Table 4 describes the two classification levels, SECRET and RESTRICTED, used 
in the Operation Artemis scenario. One of these security classifications is assigned to all 
the users and assets in the scenario. The game engine will use these classifications as the 




Classification Attributes and Descriptions 
 
Description 
Security clearance of Secret and beyond is 
a prerequisite for personnel working on the 
logistics plans for Ops Artemis, AAF's 
operations in Qari. The information or 
material of this classification requires a 
substantial degree of protection and the 
unauthorized disclosure could cause 
serious damage to the national security of 
Alliswell and seriously impair its 
operations 
Security Level 10 
Value to 
Organization 100000 







All personnel working in HQ 368 Logistics 
Command are cleared to a minimum 
security level of Restricted. The 
information or material of this 
classification requires protection and the 
unauthorized disclosure of that information 
could be harmful to AAF's national 
security. 
Security Level 6 
Value to 
Organization 1000 







Table 4. Secrecy Attributes and Descriptions. 
 
G. ASSETS 
The assets are the information or materials that are of a certain value to the 
organization. Users will access these assets as part of their user goals. The following 
sections provide descriptions of the assets in the Operation Artemis scenario.  
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1. Ops_Artemis_Log_Plan 
This is the logistics coordination plan for Operation Artemis, AAF's operation in 
Qari. It is critical to the success of AAR's mission. MAJ Carson and WO Hector are the 
only two users  allowed access to this asset. MAJ Carson will be assigned to work on this 
asset in Phase 1 of the scenario and WO Hector will also be assigned to work on it in the 
second phase. The asset has a classification of SECRET. There are two sets of potential 
attackers assigned, Ms Aida Young and Public, that have a high attack motivation value 
of 501. 
2. Log_Web_Research_Data 
The Internet provides a rich source of information on the latest and most 
innovative logistics management methodologies. AAF is constantly reviewing and 
upgrading the way its logistics operations are carried out. The research will aid in the 
effort to improve and optimize AAF’s logistics management approaches. Ms Aida Young 
will be assigned to work on this asset in the fourth phase of the scenario. The asset has a 
classification of RESTRICTED and there is a low attack motivation for attackers to 
compromise it. 
 
H. USER GOALS 
User Goals define the needs of users to gain access to the specified assets. The 
users’ productivity and happiness levels are affected by their ability to accomplish the 
assigned goals.  The following sections describe the User Goals defined in the Operation 
Artemis scenario. 
1. MajCarson_Work_on_LogPlan and WoHector_Work_on_LogPlan 
This goal will require the user to create and maintain the Logistics Plan for 
Operation Artemis which is critical to the mission success of AAF's Operation in Qari. 
MAJ Carson will be assigned to work on this goal in the first phase of the scenario. In the 
second phase, the player will have to purchase a high integrity computer and place it in 
the secured zone for WO Hector to work on the same goal. 
2. LogPlanners_Use_NewSW 
This goal will require the player to purchase a new logistics chain supply 
management software product in order for the users, MAJ Carson and WO Hector, to 
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accomplish their goals. The player will have to purchase LogOn which is the only 
software product that is of high integrity and is suitable for use in the highly sensitive 
environment. 
3. Aida_Work_on_WebResearch 
This goal in Phase 4 of the scenario requires the player to provide Internet access 
to Ms Aida Young in order for her to work on the asset, Log_Web_Research_Data, and 
to accomplish this assigned goal. The player will have to ensure that he continues to 
maintain the air-gapped network architecture of the ARILS IntraNet while trying to 
provide Internet access for Ms Young. Connecting ARILS IntraNet to the Internet will 
corrupt mission-critical assets that are residing on the server. 
4. Secured_Data_Transfer 
This goal will be assigned to SGT Anson in Phase 5. The player will have to 
ensure that SGT Anson’s computer in the server room is the only computer that has 
access to media devices. This can be done by setting the server room’s physical security 
attributes to allow media access. The other zones in the scenario should have the Prohibit 
Media attribute set. 
 
I PHASES AND OBJECTIVES 
This section provides a description of the five game phases and the phase 
objectives created in the Operation Artemis scenario. The triggering conditions that will 
result in the completion or non-completion of the objectives in the phases are shown in 
Table 5. 
1. Phase0_MoveAsset 
This is the first phase of the scenario. It requires the player to identify the 
potentially unsecured setup in HQ 368 Logistics Command that may compromise the 
mission-critical asset residing on the ARILS server. To complete the scenario, the player 
will have to identify the Logistics Operation Cell as the safest and most secured zone in 
the building and set up the workstation that is in the zone, connecting it to the ARILS 
IntraNet in order for MAJ Carson to be able to work on the Qari_Log_Plan. At the same 
time, the player has to ensure that the ARILS IntraNet is not connected to the Internet or 
any other networks that are of lower integrity. 
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Objective Description (i.e. Uncompleted Text) 
Although HQ 368 is a relatively secured building, there is still a need to ensure 
all mission critical assets are accorded the right amount of protection. The integrity of 
the assets may be compromised by accidental changes made by unauthorized or 
untrained personnel, or by determined adversaries who may attempt to corrupt or steal 
these assets. 
Phase Description (i.e. Completed Text)  
Well done Lieutenant! It is important to provide adequate physical security to 
protect the mission-critical assets from both accidental and deliberate corruptions. 
2. Phase1_BuyPC 
This is the second phase of the scenario. It requires the player to purchase a 
workstation that is built on a high integrity platform and place it in the secured zone, 
Logistics Operation Cell, for WO Hector to be able to work on the Qari_Log_Plan. The 
player will have to decide on one of the five available workstations in the component 
catalog. In order to achieve the objective, the player will have to buy either Gell Mil or 
Gell Cool workstation, which has a high integrity operating system and does not come 
installed with potentially malicious software applications.  
Objective Description (i.e. Uncompleted Text) 
WO Hector needs to assist MAJ Carson in working out the Qari logistics plan. In 
order for WO Hector to work on the plan and meet his goal, you need to provide him with 
a system and help connect him to the ARILS IntraNet. 
Phase Description (i.e. Completed Text)  
Acquiring high integrity systems from a trusted source is a critical part in 
maintaining IA for a sensitive environment. Unneeded software applications that are 
from unknown or non-trusted origin should not reside on high integrity systems, as they 
could potentially be malicious. Thus, not having them will help reduce the risk of 




3. Phase2_BuySW  
This is the third phase of the scenario. It requires the player to purchase a logistics 
supply chain management software application for the logistics planners, MAJ Carson 
and WO Hector. There are three logistics applications available for purchase and the 
player can invoke the CyberCIEGE encyclopedia to view their descriptions. To succeed 
in this phase, the player has to purchase LogOn, which is a logistics software application 
developed in a controlled environment for military use.  
Objective Description (i.e. Uncompleted Text) 
The command is looking for good logistics supply chain management software 
application that can aid the logistics planners in their work. Your task is to identify and 
purchase a suitable logistics management application for the command. You can find the 
descriptions of the available logistics applications in the CyberCIEGE encyclopedia. 
(Press ‘e’ to invoke CyberCIEGE encyclopedia.) 
Phase Description (i.e. Completed Text)  
It is important to ensure that software applications running on a sensitive network 
are of trusted origin. Software products with low integrity can potentially corrupt the 
network and its high integrity systems. Keep up the good work Lieutenant! 
4. Phase3_ WebAccess  
This is the fourth phase of the scenario. It requires the player to provide Internet 
access to Ms Aida Young so that she can accomplish her goal on researching logistics 
data on the Internet. In order for the player to complete this phase, he/she will have to 
provide an Internet connection for Ms Young and also ensure that the highly sensitive 
ARILS IntraNet and the mission-critical asset on it are not exposed to the Internet. 
ARILS IntraNet has to maintain the air-gapped network structure, so a separate network 
for only Internet access will have to be created.  
Objective Description (i.e. Uncompleted Text) 
The Internet provides a rich source of information on the latest and most 
innovative logistics management methodologies. AAF is constantly reviewing and 
upgrading the way its logistics operations are carried out. Ms Aida Young has been 
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tasked to research and work on the Log_Web_Research_Data. The research will aid in 
the effort to improve and optimize AAF’s logistics management approaches. 
Phase Description (i.e. Completed Text) 
In order to satisfy the users’ desire to connect to Internet in this sensitive 
environment, there is a need to maintain a network that is strictly for Internet access only 
and totally separated from the air-gapped backbone network. Well done Lieutenant! 
5. Phase4_CntDataMvt  
This is the fifth and final phase of the scenario. The users in the command 
requested that they be allowed to transfer data to and from the sensitive ARILS IntraNet, 
so the player will have to identify a secure way of satisfying this request. To complete 
this phase of the game, the player will have to ensure that the only zone in the building 
that allows media access is the Server room and the only computer that allows removable 
media is the one that resides in the server room. These will simulate and mimic the 
transfer of data through a trusted and controlled point.  
Objective Description (i.e. Uncompleted Text) 
The logistics planners requested that some of Ms Young’s' web research data be 
made available to them. They also feel that it would be useful if they are able to move 
data between the networks. SGT Anson is looking for ways to meet these requests. Your 
task is to help SGT Anson determine the most appropriate way to perform the data 
transfer. 
Phase Description (i.e. Completed Text) 
It is important to prohibit or restrict media devices on sensitive systems in order 
to protect their integrity. A strict control on data movement between systems or networks 
with different integrity and sensitive levels is critical in protecting the high integrity 
systems or networks. Therefore, restricting the number of accessible avenues into the 













































True Obj_4th_WebAccess _Met AND Secured_Data_Transfer 
4 Obj_Phase_5th_CntDataMvt 
False 





Table 5. Phase and Objective Requirements. 
 
J. TRIGGERS  






The triggers, MajCC_Greetings, WoHH_Greetings etc, in this trigger group are of 
the trigger class, SpeakTrigger. They are used to activate dialogue boxes for introducing 
the users to the player.  
2. Msg_To_Player 
These groups of triggers, Log_Plan_Attack_8_1st_Msg, 
Log_Plan_Attack_17_1st_Msg etc, are of the trigger class, MessageTrigger. They are 
used to activate text boxes during the game to inform the players of events that are 
happening. 
3. Attack_Trigger 
There are two triggers in this group, Mal_Attack and Insider_Attack, both are of 
trigger class AttackTrigger. 
Mal_Attack 
This trigger will set off Attack Type 8. It has a set frequency of 0.05 which will 
cause the game engine to generate malicious software attacks on any exposed assets 
every three minutes.  
Insider_Attack 
This trigger will set off Attack Type 17. It has a set frequency of 0.05 which will 
cause the game engine to generate insider attacks every three minutes on any assets that 
are exposed to the public, or to users who do not meet the assets’ MAC policy.  
4. SetNext_Phase 
The triggers, 1st_Phase_Done_Next, 2nd_Phase_Done_Next, 
3rd_Phase_Done_Next, 4th_Phase_Done_Next, are SetPhase triggers used for 
progressing to the next phase of the game when the player has met all the objectives of 
the phase.  
5. Set_Objective_Status 
The triggers that are in this group include, Move_Asset_Done, BuyPC_Done, 
BuySW_Done, WebAccess_Done and CntDataMvt_Done. They are of trigger class, 
SetPhaseObjective and are used for indicating that a particular objective of the phase is 
completed when all the firing conditions of the triggers are met. 
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K. CONDITIONS 
The following describes the main conditions that are defined in the Operation 
Artemis scenario. The conditions are set in the scenario to check for the occurrences of a 
particular event which the game engine will use for executing the corresponding triggers. 
1. Timing 
This group of conditions which include delay1hr, delay2hrs etc. are of condition 
class TimingCondition and are used for timing events in the scenario. 
2. Asset_Attacked 
There are two conditions in this group, Malware_Atk_LogPlan and 
Insider_Atk_LogPlan. These are conditions belong to AssetAttacked condition class and 
are used for checking the occurrence of an attack on an asset 
MalWare_Atk_LogPlan 
This condition will check for the occurrence of an attack on the mission-critical 
asset, Ops_Artemis_Log_Plan, by malicious software. 
Insider_Atk_LogPlan 
This condition will check for the occurrence of an attack on the mission-critical 
asset, Ops_Artemis_Log_Plan, by an insider. 
3. LogPlan_In_OpsRm 
This condition will check for the presence of Ops_Artemis_Log_Plan in the 
Logistics Operation Cell. 
4. Checking_Conditions 
This group of conditions which includes AdminNet_to_LogPlan, 
Web_to_LogPlan, etc., is used to check for the occurrence of specific events in the game.  
AdminNet_To_LogPlan 
This condition will check if the mission-critical asset, Ops_Artemis_Log_Plan is 
found on the Administrative Network, ARILS Admin Net. Having the asset on the 





This condition will check if the mission-critical asset, Ops_Artemis_Log_Plan is 
connected to the Internet. It is not desirable for the asset to be exposed to the Internet 
which will compromise it. 
 
5. Phase_Completed 
This group consists of the five conditions 1st_Phase_Done, 2nd_Phase_Done, 
3rd_Phase_Done, 4th_Phase_Done and 5th_Phase_Done. These are PhaseCompleted 
conditions and are used for indicating the completion of the phases.  
6. Objective_Completed 
This group consists of the five conditions Obj_1st_MoveAsset_Met, 
Obj_2nd_BuyPC_Met, Obj_3rd_BuySW_Met, Obj_4th_WebAccess_Met and 
Obj_5th_CntDataMvt_Met. These are ObjectiveCompleted conditions and are used for 
indicating that a particular objective of the phases is met. 
7. Asset_Goal_Met 
This group consists of the five conditions MajCarson_Work_on_LogPlan, 
WoHector_Work_on_LogPlan, LogPlanners_Use_NewSW, Aida_Work_on_Web and 
Research Secured_Data_Transfer. These are AllAssetGoalsMeet conditions and are used 
for indicating that a particular user goal has been achieved. 
  
L. SUMMARY 
The virtual users, user goals, assets, components, devices, triggers, conditions etc. 
that were used to create the Operation Artemis scenario were discussed in detail in this 
chapter. Each of these elements contributes to the creation of a scenario that is capable of 
mimicking real world security issues found in a military environment and can be used to 
convey security lessons on the importance of integrity to players. 
The next chapter will look at the testing done for this thesis. The objectives and 
methodologies used in the construction of Operation Artemis scenario test cases, and the 
test results will be discussed. The proposed solution to the scenario will also be provided. 
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V. SCENARIO TESTING 
This chapter discusses the test objectives and methodologies applied to evaluate 
the execution of the Operation Artemis scenario. The two categories of test cases 
developed to evaluate the scenario are described in detail. This chapter also covers the 
informal testing conducted during the scenario development process which contributed to 
the improvement of the SDT and the CyberCIEGE game engine. 
 
A. TEST OBJECTIVE 
The purpose of conducting the tests was to demonstrate that the Operation 
Artemis scenario can reasonably simulate real-world behaviors and security issues found 
in a military environment. 
The results from the tests and the bug fixes on the SDT and CyberCIEGE game 
engine contribute to the overall improvement of CyberCIEGE as a security educational 
tool and reduced unwanted non-deterministic aspects of the game engine. 
 
B. TESTING METHODOLOGY 
The approach taken to test the correctness of Operation Artemis involved the 
development of two categories of test cases. The first category identifies the desired or 
preferred game moves and the expected results from the execution of these moves. The 
second category of test cases identified several possible incorrect game moves that 
players could execute and the expected results from the execution of these moves.   
 
C. TEST CASES 
The following section describes the test objectives of the five phases in the 
Operation Artemis scenario and the two categories of test cases developed to evaluate the 
scenario. Table 6 shows the preferred game moves to achieve the scenario objectives and 
the expected results from the execution of these moves in the scenario while Table 7 
shows the incorrect game moves that a player could possibly execute and the expected 
results from making such moves. 
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1.  Phase 0 Test Objectives 
The test cases created for the first phase of the scenario are used to determine 
whether the phase was correctly developed to illustrate to the player the importance of 
maintaining physical security in a sensitive military environment. 
2.  Phase 1 Test Objectives 
For the second phase, the test cases evaluate if the phase was correctly developed 
to illustrate to the player that acquiring high integrity systems from a trusted source is 
critical to achieving IA in a sensitive environment. The test cases also check whether the 
phase can correctly illustrate to the player that unnecessary software applications from 
unknown or non-trusted origin should not reside on high integrity systems, as they could 
be potentially malicious. 
3.  Phase 2 Test Objectives 
The test cases for the third phase evaluate if the phase was correctly developed to 
illustrate to the player that for sensitive systems and networks, it is important to acquire 
only high integrity software applications developed within a trusted and controlled 
environment..  
4.  Phase 3 Test Objectives 
The test cases for this phase evaluate if the phase was correctly developed to 
illustrate to the player that there is a need to maintain an air-gapped network architecture 
for sensitive backbone networks of the organization. 
5.  Phase 4 Test Objectives 
This set of test cases for the final phase are used to evaluate if the phase was 
correctly developed to illustrate the importance of prohibiting or restricting removable 
media devices (e.g. USB ports, portable storage devices etc.) on sensitive systems when 
protection of system integrity is needed. Strict control of data movement between 
systems or networks with different integrity and sensitivity levels is critical in protecting 








Phase Test Case ID Preferred Game Moves Expected Results 
0 TCA_P0 
Step 1: The player removes the 
network connection between the 
ARILS_AdminNet and the 
ARILS_Server. 
 
Step 2: ARILS_PC4 is then 
connected to the ARILS_IntraNet 
which is also connected to the 
ARILS_Server. 
 
Step 3: MAJ Carson is assigned to 
work on ARILS_PC4 in the 
Logistics Command Cell. 
ARILS_PC4, which is connected to 
the ARILS_IntraNet, will be used 
for accessing the mission-critical 
asset, Ops_Artemis_Log_Plan. 
The ARILS_AdminNet is 
disconnected from the 
ARILS_Server and cannot 
access the 
Ops_Artemis_Log_Plan. 
Thus, protecting the asset 
from malicious users. 
 
MAJ Carson has the “no asset 
goal” failure and is working 
on the Ops Artemis log plan 
in the operation logistic cell. 
 
The first phase of the scenario 
is completed. 
 
Proceed to the next phase. 
 
1 TCA_P1 
Step 1: In the ‘Buy’ Screen, the 
player purchases either the Gell Mil 
or Gell Cool workstation 
 
Step 3:  The purchased workstation 
is placed on the empty table in the 
Logistic Command Cell and 
connected it to the ARILS_IntraNet 
and the ARILS_Server. 
 
Step 4:  WO Hector is assigned to 
work in the Logistic Command Cell 
using the new workstation which is 
connected to the ARILS_IntraNet 
and can be used for accessing the 
mission-critical asset, 
Ops_Artemis_Log_Plan. 
A new workstation of either 
the Gell Mil or Gell Cool 
model is purchased and placed 
in the Logistic Command 
Cell. 
 
WO Hector has the “no asset 
goal” failure and is working 
on Ops Artemis log plan in 
the operation logistic cell. 
 
Second phase of the scenario 
is completed. 
. 
Proceed to the next phase. 
 
2 TCA_P2 
Step 1:  The player purchases the 
logistic management software 
application, Log On for the 
ARILS_Server that is in the Server 
Room. 
A new logistic management 
software application is 
purchased and installed onto 
the ARILS_Server. 
 
Both MAJ Carson and WO 
Hector have the “no asset 
goal” failure and are working 
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Phase Test Case ID Preferred Game Moves Expected Results 
on Ops Artemis log plan in 
the operation logistic cell. 
 
Third phase of the scenario is 
completed. 
 
Proceed to the next phase. 
 
3 TCA_P3 
Step 1:   On the ‘Network’ screen, 
the player selects ARILS_Router3 
which is located in the Logistic 
Admin zone and connects it to the 
Wild_World_Web to gain Internet 
access. 
 
Step 3: The ARILS_AdminNet 
icon is then connected to 
ARILS_Router3. 
 
Step 4: The player then assigns Ms 
Aida Young to either ARILS_PC1 
or ARILS_PC2 in order for her to 
work on the 
Log_Web_Research_Data asset. 
ARILS_AdminNet is 
connected to the 
Wild_World_Web. 
 
Both ARILS_PC1 and 
ARILS_PC2 which is on the 
ARILS_AdminNet can be 
used for accessing the 
Internet. 
 
Ms Young has the “no asset 
goal” failure and is using 
either  ARILS_PC1 or 
ARILS_PC2  to work on the 
Log_Web_Research_Data. 
 
The fourth phase of the 
scenario is completed. 
 
Proceed to the next phase. 
 
4 TCA_P4 
Step 1:  In the ‘Zone’ screen, the 
player selects the Server Room and 
unchecks the ‘Block Removable 
Media’ attribute of the ‘Component 
Settings’ panel. 
 
Step 2:  On the ‘Component’ 
screen, ARILS_PC3 is selected and 
its ‘Block Removable Media’ 
attribute in the ‘Default 
Configuration Settings’ is 
unchecked. 
Server Room is the only zone 
that allows removal media. 
 
ARLS_PC3 residing in the 
Server Room is the only 
workstation that allows 
removal media. 
 
SGT Anson has the “no asset 
goal” failure. 
 
The fifth phase of the scenario 
is completed. 
 
Scenario ended, player has 
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Phase Test Case ID Preferred Game Moves Expected Results 
completed all the objectives in 




Table 6. Test Case for Preferred Game Moves. 
 
Phase Test Case ID Possible Incorrect Game Moves Expected Results 
TCB_P0a 
Step 1: The player connects 
ARILS_PC4 which is in the 
secured zone, Logistic Operation 
Cell, to the ARILS_IntraNet and 
ARILS_Server and assigns MAJ 
Carson to ARILS_PC4. 
 
Step 2: ARILS_AdminNet is not 
disconnected from the 
ARILS_Server. 
Even though MAJ Carson is 
working on the mission-
critical asset, 
Ops_Artemis_Log_Plan, 
using a high integrity 
workstation in a secured zone, 
the player’s failure in 
disconnecting the 
ARILS_AdminNet from the 
ARILS_Server will provide 
potential avenues of attack for 
malicious software and 
insiders to compromise the 
asset. 
 
Malicious software and 









Step 1: The player disconnects the 
ARILS_AdminNet from the 
ARILS_Server. 
 
Step 2:  The player connects 
ARILS_PC4 which is in the 
secured zone, Logistic Operation 
Cell, to the ARILS_IntraNet and 
ARILS_Server and assigns MAJ 
Carson to ARILS_PC4 
 
Step 1: The player connects 
Disconnecting the 
ARILS_AdminNet from the 
ARILS_Server prevents 
unauthorized insider from 
compromising the asset.  
 
However, connecting the 
ARILS_IntraNet to the 
Internet will expose the asset 




Phase Test Case ID Possible Incorrect Game Moves Expected Results 
ARILS_IntraNet to the 
Wild_World_Web using any of 




continues to be corrupted by 
malicious users on the 
Internet. 
 




Step 1: The player purchases a 
workstation that is neither of the 
two available high integrity 
models, Gell Mil and Gell Cool, 
that comes with a trusted OS and 
are on a higher integrity platform. 
 
 
Step 2: The player places the low 
integrity workstation in the 
secured zone and connects it to the 
ARILS_IntraNet and 
ARILS_Server and assigns WO 
Hector to it 
 
Even though the WO Hector 
is working on the mission-
critical asset in the secured 
zone. The low integrity 
platform of the workstation 
coupled with the unnecessary 
software applications of 
unknown origin, residing on 
the workstation, will 
compromise the asset. 
 









Step 1: The player purchases a 
high integrity model workstation, 
Gell Mil or Gell Cool that comes 




Step 2: The player places the high 
integrity workstation in the 
unsecured zone and connects it to 
the ARILS_IntraNet and 
ARILS_Server and assigns WO 
Hector to it. 
 
Even though the WO Hector 
is working on the mission-
critical asset the zone that he 
is working in is unsecured. 
Thus, unauthorized insiders 
can potentially compromise 
the mission-critical asset. 
 




The phase objective is not 
achieved. 
 
2 TCB_P2a Step 1: The player purchases a 
logistics management software 
application that is not Log On.  
 
Software applications that are 
of unknown origin or are not 
developed under a controlled 
environment have the 
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Phase Test Case ID Possible Incorrect Game Moves Expected Results 
Step 2: The software is installed in 
any of the workstations or the 
server on ARILS_IntraNet. 
 
potential to compromise the 
sensitive network and asset.  
 








Step 1: The player purchases the 
logistic management software 
application, Log On that was 
developed under a controlled 
environment for military use.  
 
Step 2: Log On was installed in 
any of the network devices other 
that the ARILS_Server. 
Not installing Log On on 
ARILS_Server will prevent 
anyone from gaining access to 
the application and the users 
will fail to meet their goals.  
 
Depending on where Log On 
is installed, either MAJ 
Carson, WO Hector or both 
logistic planners will have 
asset goal failures.  
 




Step 1: The player connects 
ARILS_AdminNet to the 
Wild_World_Web to gain access 
to the Internet. 
 
 
Step 2: Ms Aida Young is 
assigned to either ARILS_PC1 or 
ARILS_PC2 in the Administrative 
zone to work on the 
Log_Web_Research_Data 
 
Step 3: The player connects 
ARILS_AdminNet to the 
ARILS_Server. 
Connecting the 
ARILS_IntraNet to the 
Internet will expose the asset 
to malicious attackers. 
 
Ops_Artemis_Log_Plan is 
corrupted by malicious users 
on the Internet. 
 
The phase objective is not 
achieved. 
 
4 TCB_P4a Step 1: The player unchecks the 
‘Block Removable Media’ option 
of any zones other than the Server 
SGT Uri Anson is in the 
Server Room with his 
workstation to provide a 
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Phase Test Case ID Possible Incorrect Game Moves Expected Results 
Room to allow removable media 
devices in the specified zone. 
 
 
centralized, trusted and 
controlled point for the 
movement of data between 
networks of different integrity 
levels. 
 
Allowing removable media in 
zones other that the Server 
Room will contradict the 
above policy. 
 
SGT Anson will have asset 
goal failure. 
 




Step 1: The player unchecks the 
‘Block Removable Media’ option 
of any workstations other than 
ARILS_PC3 that is in the Server 
Room to allow removable media 




As mentioned earlier, the 
command’s policy is to have a 
centralized, trusted and 
controlled point for the 
movement of data between 
networks of different integrity 
levels. Allowing removable 
media on non-authorized 
workstations will contradict 
the above policy. 
 
SGT Anson will have asset 
goal failure. 
 




Table 7. Test Case for Incorrect Game Moves 
 
D. EVALUATION RESULTS 
Table 8 summarizes the results of executing all the test cases that were described 





Test No. Test Case ID Results 
1 TCA_P0 As anticipated 
2 TCA_P1 As anticipated 
3 TCA_P2 As anticipated 
4 TCA_P3 As anticipated 
5 TCA_P4 As anticipated 
6 TCB_P0a As anticipated 
7 TCB_P0b As anticipated 
8 TCB_P1a As anticipated 
9 TCB_P1b As anticipated 
10 TCB_P2a As anticipated 
11 TCB_P2b As anticipated 
12 TCB_P3a As anticipated 
13 TCB_P4a As anticipated 
14 TCB_P4b As anticipated 
 
Table 8. Scenario Evaluation Results. 
 
E. INFORMAL TESTS 
During the scenario development process, small sets of test cases were informally 
developed and used for evaluating sections of the scenario. Through these informal tests, 
bugs or discrepancies in the CyberCIEGE game engine or the SDT were discovered and 
reported. The majority of these discrepancies were fixed and released in an updated 
version of the CyberCIEGE game. Table 9 summarizes the key discrepancies in the game 
engine or SDT that were uncovered through these informal testes conducted during the 
development of the Operation Artemis scenario. 
 
No. Descriptions of Game Engine or SDT Bug Resolution 
1 The SDT’s User DAC Group panel failed to display contents. Fixed 
2 
There is a need to limit the number of words in the component 
description to prevent the CyberCIEGE game from crashing when 
the player purchases a component. 
Fixed 
3 
Network connections not correctly displayed in the game’s 
Network screen when the connected devices are not shown 
together on the screen. 
Not Fixed 
4 The SDT’s Log file creator was corrupted. Asset attacks are reported in logfile.txt but can’t be viewed in the Log Viewer. Fixed 
5 The SDT failed to execute Validate, Build and Run commands simultaneously due to a lack of memory. Fixed 
6 
When an item is sold by the player, the item continues to 




No. Descriptions of Game Engine or SDT Bug Resolution 
7 The users’ thoughts generated by game engine were not meaningful. Fixed 
8 The asset goal description was truncated on the User screen Fixed 
9 The SDT does not recognize the reserved word ‘(PARAGRAPH)’ in the objective description. Not Fixed 
10 
Malicious software attacks on the assets failed to materialize even 
when the workstation connected to the assets is installed with low 
integrity software applications and there is a high attack motive of 
501. 
Fixed 
11 The game engine renders similar character graphics for all the three male characters in the game. Not Fixed 
12 The game engine automatically halved the cost of asset being attacked when the asset was attacked a second time. Not Fixed 
 
Table 9. Description of the discrepancies found and their resolutions, as of the 
publication of this thesis.  
 
F. SUMMARY 
The testing methodologies and test cases discussed in this chapter verified that the 
Operation Artemis scenario is capable of achieving its intended security educational 
goals. The informal tests conducted during the scenario development process helped to 
uncover discrepancies in the SDT and the CyberCIEGE game engine, which led to fixes. 
These fixes significantly improved the functionality and usability of the SDT and the 
game engine.  
 
The next and final chapter will provide recommendations and suggestions for 





VI.  CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
This chapter provides recommendations, suggests future work for the 
CyberCIEGE project and concludes the thesis. 
 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
In the course of developing and testing the Operation Artemis scenario, some 
SDT and game engine discrepancies were encountered. These discrepancies and their 
resolutions were summarized in Table 9 of Chapter V.  The following sections discuss 
the discrepancies that are yet to be resolved and should be addressed in the future updates 
of the game engine. 
1. Network Connection 
The network connections that exist among devices are shown graphically on the 
CyberCIEGE ‘Network’ screen. As shown in Figure 7, the connecting line between the 
devices is a graphical indication that these devices are interconnected. However, when 
the interconnected devices are not shown together on the same screen, as seen in Figure 
8, the connecting line disappears.  This graphical discrepancy of the game should be 
corrected to improve not only the playability of the game, but also to allow players to 
have a realistic depiction of the network connections. 
 
Figure 7.   Connecting line indicates interconnected devices. 
 
 
Figure 8.   Connecting line disappears. 
 
2. User Graphics 
The CyberCIEGE graphic engine renders good three dimensional graphics of the 
characters in the game. However, these character graphics are limited in variety and are 
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not controllable by the scenario developers. Figure 9 shows MAJ Carson, WO Hector and 
SGT Anson, the three male characters of the Operation Artemis scenario, who, due to the 
graphics provided by the underlying game engine look graphically identical. 
Improvement to this graphical aspect of the game will improve the realism of the game. 
In addition, for military games, the graphics for the characters should include insignias 
and uniforms reflecting the appropriate rank of the users described. 
 
 
Figure 9.   Operation Artemis triplets 
 
3. Cost of Attacks 
The cost as a result of a malicious attack on an asset is set using the SDT. The 
value set will be the amount of money the player will lose when an attack occurs. If a 
similar attack happens again on the same asset, the game engine will automatically halve 
the cost of being attacked. This halving of the cost of being attacked is not controllable 
by the scenario developer and does not mimic the real-world situation well. It is 
suggested that the cost of subsequent attacks be controllable by the scenario developer. 
Improving this aspect of the game will improve its realism 
4. Software Component 
Players can purchase or remove software components in CyberCIEGE by clicking 
on the ‘Software’ icon of the devices to invoke the ‘Manage Software’ screen. However, 
the description of the available software components can only be viewed by activating 
the CyberCIEGE encyclopedia. To improve the game play, it is suggested that the 





B. FUTURE WORK 
Due to the limited time available to complete this thesis, the ‘Money’ aspect of 
the CyberCIEGE game has not been fully exploited. Future work on the Operation 
Artemis scenario should involve the fine tuning on the use of ‘Money’ to create tension 
and sway the player’s decision cycles. This will provide better realism and increase the 
challenge of the scenario. 
A user trial should also be conducted with the completed Operation Artemis 
scenario on students from the NPS computer science department and DoD system 
administrators to check if the scenario fulfils the objective of conveying security lessons 
about the need of having software integrity and an air-gapped network architecture in a 
sensitive military environment. 
 
C. CONCLUSION 
The Operation Artemis scenario developed for this thesis consists of five 
intriguing game phases that convey security lessons on the importance of software 
integrity in a sensitive military environment and the need of an air-gapped network 
architecture for mission-critical military backbone networks. With its successful 
development, the three thesis questions posed in the first chapter are answered.  
The first thesis question asked if a scenario can be developed such that it is both 
playable and educational while illustrating the need for security and protection on 
mission critical data in a networked military environment? The answer to this question is 
yes. The development of Operation Artemis has demonstrated that CyberCIEGE, with its 
rich elements and tools, is capable of creating game scenarios that mimics real life IA 
issues and can be used for conveying security lessons to a wide audience of trainees. 
The second thesis question asked whether a scenario can illustrate the tensions, 
trade-offs and decisions a network manager has to make when deciding between the use 
of an air-gapped network that is separated from the internet and the need for web 
connections? The fourth phase of Operation Artemis was developed to answer this 
question. In order to successfully complete this phase of the game, the player has to make  
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the decision to satisfy the users’ desire for Internet connection by creating and 
maintaining a network that is strictly for Internet access only and totally separated from 
the air-gapped backbone network. 
The third and final thesis question asked from the perspective of information 
assurance, to what extent is the use of commercial software on an air-gapped network 
comparable to connecting the network to the Internet, in terms of subjecting the network 
to possible malicious acts by adversaries? The third phase of Operation Artemis 
demonstrated that it is important to ensure that software applications running on a 
sensitive network are of trusted origin. Software products with low integrity can 
potentially corrupt the network and its high integrity systems. The installation of low 
integrity software on highly sensitive systems with an air-gapped network architecture 
exposes the systems to a high possibility of compromise which is similar to that of 
connecting the air-gapped network to the Internet. 
The importance of Information Assurance (IA) in military operations cannot be 
overstated. In its quest to safeguard its information systems, the military faces the same 
risks and challenges as any other government or private sector organization that has 
heavy reliance on today’s wired world. The provision of security education to all 
personnel in the organization is critical to achieving IA. This thesis demonstrated that 
CyberCIEGE, with its rich elements and tools, can be used to create game scenarios, 
mimicking real life IA issues, for conveying security lessons to a wide audience of 
trainees. It provides an excellent alternative to traditional methods of security education 
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